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Cunningham: Aversion Therapy and the Involuntarily Confined: Rehabilitation o

COMMENTARIES
AVERSION THERAPY AND THE INVOLUNTARILY CONFINED:
REHABILITATION OR RETRIBUTION?"
In trying to solve the terrifying problems that face us in the world today, we naturally turn to the things we do best. We play from strength,
and our strength is science and technology.'
Extensive and rapid development of the behavioral and biological sciences
in the twentieth century has given birth to the concept of the "therapeutic
state" - a legal framework with the announced aim of the treatment and cure
of deviant behavior. 2 The compatibility of this concept with modern penological theory, which views the social retraining of the criminal as the ultimate
objective, 3 has created issues inconceivable fifty years ago. The use of contemporary methods of behavior control 4 on the involuntarily confined is one
such issue. These technologies, involving use of psychiatric techniques that
alter behaviors reflect the crucial problem implicit in the therapeutic approach: a total lack of boundaries resulting from its unprecedented nature. 6
This commentary will examine aversion therapy,7 one of the more common
behavior control techniques used on prisoners in penal institutions. It will
focus on the applicable prior law, and recently addressed issues of cruel and
*EDITOR'S NOTE: This commentary received the University of FloridaLaw Review Alumni
Association Commentary Award as the outstanding commentary submitted during the spring
1974 quarter.
1. B.F. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY 1 (2d ed. 1971).
2. "The implications of the therapeutic state for the treatment of crime and criminals
are dramatic ....
Crime is viewed as a natural feature of the social landscape. Criminals
are no longer 'bad,' though they must be dealt with because they are injurious to society.
As the moral-religious preoccupation with moral guilt . . . now gives way to the concept of
sanctions mainly as a tool of social defense, the door is opened to new experiments with the
treatment of offenders." N. KIIrRIE, THE RIGHT To BE DIFFERENT: DEVIANCE AND ENFORCED
THERAPY 39-40 (1971).
3.

See CONTEMPORARY

PUNISHMENT:

VIEwS,

EXPLANATIONS,

AND

JUSTIFICATIONS

175-227

(R. Gerber & P. McAnany eds. 1972). "The concept of 'treatment' has replaced the concept
of 'punishment."' Bergan, The Sentencing Power in Criminal Cases, 13 ALBANY L. REV. 1,
3 (1949).
4. "In its broadest sense behavior control can be viewed as a special form of behavioral
change. It is treatment imposed on or offered to the patient that to a large extent is designed to satisfy the wishes of others. Such treatment may lead to the patient's behaving in
a manner which satisfies his community or his society." Halleck, Legal and Ethical Aspects
of Behavior Control, 131 Am. J. PSYCHiATRY 381 (1974). Behavior control has also been defined simply as getting people i.o do someone else's bidding. See P. LONDON, BEHAVIOR CONTROL 3 (1970).
5. See Note, Conditioning and Other Technologies Used to "Treat?" "Rehabilitate?"
"Demolish?" Prisonersand Mental Patients,45 S. CAL. L. REV. 616 n.1 (1972).
6. "Of the multitude of problems associated with the therapeutic model, the great bulk
can be summarized under a single unifying theme: that the therapeutic approach knows no
bounds." Wexler, TherapeuticJustice, 57 MINN. L. REV. 289, 293 (1972).
7. See text accompanying notes 18-19 infra.
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unusual punishment and informed consent to the use of such techniques.
Analytical shortcomings of recent decisions will be examined, and recommendations made for future judicial analysis of similar issues.
BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION

Behavior modification takes many forms.8 Some are noncoercive, such as

milieu therapy9 and psychotherapy.1o These pose few problems for the involuntarily confined because an inmate can avoid the effects of such physically
nonintrusive techniques with a minimum degree of mental resistance.1 ' Major
"organic" techniques,12 however, involve physical intrusion into the body that
may be impossible for an inmate to avoid. These intrusive techniques indude psychosurgery,'13 electronic stimulation of the brain (ESB),'4 and drug
therapy.15 Most widely used among these three, particularly in the institutional
setting, is drug therapy.' 6

Drug therapy is less drastic than psychosurgery's irreversible alteration of
the brain, seemingly involving only temporary adverse physiological effects,
and is more easily administered than psychosurgery or ESB. Consequently, it
is readily adaptable to institutional use. Although drug therapy includes the
8. Techniques include milieu therapy, individual and group psychotherapy, drug therapy,
operant conditioning, classical conditioning, aversion therapy, electroconvulsive therapy,
electronic stimulation of the brain, lobotomy, stereotactic psychosurgery, and anectine therapy.
See Note, supra note 5, for a discussion of each of these techniques.
9. Milieu therapy involves "scientific manipulation of the environment aimed at producing changes in the personality of the patient." J. CUMMINGS & E. CUMMINGS, EGO AND
MILIEU 5 (1962). For a discussion of milieu therapy within the context of the constitutional
right of the involuntarily hospitalized to adequate psychological treatment, see Donaldson v.
O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974).
10. Psychotherapy is a means of attacking personal problems and trying to solve them
largely by talking and related processes. FOUNDATIONS OF ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 570-93
(P. London & D. Rosenhan eds. 1968).
11. "[T]raditional psychotherapy works slowly. It gives the patient time to contemplate
the meaning of behavioral change and to resist such change." Halleck, supra note 4, at 381.
See also Note, supra note 5, at 619-20.
12. These are techniques relating to or affecting internal organs of the body.
13. "Psychosurgery is a medical procedure in which brain tissue is either destroyed, removed, or cut with the intent of altering thoughts, emotions, or behavior." Spoonhour,
Psychosurgery and Informed Consent, 26 U. FLA. L. REv. 432 (1974). See B. BROWN, L. WRNrcrowsKi & L. BIvENs, PsYcHOsuRGERY: PERSPECrIVE ON A CURRENT PROBLEM 1 (HEW Publication No. HSM 73-9119, 1973); Psychosurgery Critics Prove Hard To Mollify, MEDICAL WORLD
Novs, April 14, 1972, at 38-39.
14. ESB involves the implantation of electrical conductors in the brain that, when
charged, stimulate the brain and induce the behavior associated with that part of the brain.
A. Ros&N wFE, TE SECOND GENEsIs 195 (1969). See also P. LONDON, supra note 4, at 136-51.
One study proposes ESB as an alternative to imprisonment. Ingraham & Smith, The Use of
Electronics in the Observation and Control of Human Behavior and Its Possible Use in Rehabilitation and Parole,7 IssUEs IN CRIMINOLOGY 35 (1972).
15. See A. NoyEs & L. KoL, MODERN CLINICAL PsYcHnTRY 620-38 (8th ed. 1973).
16. Drug therapy is one of the most widely used behavior control techniques and has
been used to effect a revolution in the psychiatric care of mental patients. Note, supra note
5, at 623.
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use of tranquilizers, 17 its physically intrusive use is epitomized by "aversion
8
therapy," a behavior control technique based on Pavlovian conditioning.'
Aversion therapy attempts to associate undesirable behavior with unpleasant
stimulation, hopefully resulting in a connection between the behavior and the
unpleasantness leading to a cessation of the undesirable traits.' 9
Two recent cases vividly illustrate the contemporary use of aversion therapy
as a behavior control device, and the ability of modern drugs to provide the
required unpleasant stimulation. In Mackey v. Procunier20 a prisoner stated
that he was administered, without his consent, the drug succinylcholine
(anectine), which he described as a "breath-stopping and paralyzing 'fright
drug.'" The inmate claimed that as a consequence of such "guinea-pig treatment," he regularly suffered nightmares in which he relived the frightening
experience and awakened unable to breathe. The record indicated that defendants were engaged, without patient consent, in psychiatric experimentation
with "aversive treatment" of criminal offenders. 2' The goal was to ascertain
whether, by instilling of fright and infliction of pain, accompanied by psy22
chological suggestion, behavior patterns could be affected.
Other authorities indicate that the inmate's description of anectine was
accurate. According to those who have been injected, the patient is over23
whelmed by a feeling of suffocation, of drowning, and of sinking into death.
This sensation results from the nearly complete paralysis of the skeletal muscles
and resultant suspension of respiration caused by the drug.24 After respiration
17. See, e.g., Nelson v. Heyne, 355 F. Supp. 451 (1972); Field, Benperidol in the Treatment of Sexual Offenders, 13 MEDICAL SCI. & L. 195 (1973).
18. Singer, Psychological Studies of Punishment, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 405, 423, 431 (1970).
Pavlovian conditioning is based on the theory that when environmental stimuli or the
kinetic stimuli produced by the incipient movements of the punished act are made contiguous with punishment, they take on some of the aversive properties of the punishment
itself.
19.

S. RACHMAN 8 J. TEASDALE, AVERSION THERAPY AND BEHAVIOR DISORDERS: AN ANALYSIS

xii (1969). See also H. SCHAEFER & P.

MARTIN, BEHAVIOR THERAPY 4 (1969); Kushner & Sandler, Aversion Therapy and the Concept of Punishment, 4 BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH & THERAPY

179 (1966). A review of aversion therapy may be found in MIAMI SYMPOSIUM ON THE PREDICTION OF BEHAVIOR

1967: AVERSIVE STIMULATION

(M.

Jones, ed.

1967) [hereinafter

cited

as

Discussions and examples of aversion therapy are also frequent in criminological literature. Vietor, Conditioning as a Form of Psychotherapy in Treating Delinquents: Some Data from the Literature,7 EXCERPTA CRIMINOLOGICA 3 (1967).
20. 477 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1973). Mackey was an inmate at the California Medical Facility at Vacaville.
21. Id. at 878 n.l, citing Brief for Appellant at 9, 15 n.5 and accompanying text. See
Note, supra note 5, at 663.
22. 477 F.2d at 878 n.l, citing Brief for Appellant at 9.
23. See Weiner, The Clockwork Cure, THE NATION April 3, 1972, 433, 434.
24. "During the period in which the drug is active the skeletal musculature is very
nearly completely paralyzed and, in consequence, effective respiration is suspended. Scoline
[anectine] has no anaesthetic effect. Enquires made of subjects following the paralysis indicate that they are aware of what is going on around them, for example, they can hear
what is said and that they feel the motions of their limbs. It appears therefore that the
subjects remain conscious throughout the paralysis." Campbell, Sanderson & Laverty, Characteristics of a Conditioned Response in Human Subjects During Extinction Trials Following
a Single Traumatic Conditioning Trial, 68 J. ABNORMAL & SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 627, 628 (1964).
MIAMI SYniposluM].
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stops the psychological suggestion phase of the treatment begins. Here the
technician makes both negative and positive suggestions, "spoken in a confident, authoritarian manner." 25 Negative suggestions focus on the obliteration
of unacceptable behavior, while positive suggestions focus upon the patient's
involvement with "patient government, taking individual responsibility, and
increasing constructive socialization." 26 These suggestions continue until the
effects of the anectine wear off. It is not surprising that one commentator has
characterized anectine therapy as a more efficient form of torture than the
27
"rack and screw."
Another recent aversion therapy case, Knecht v. Gillman,2 arose when two
Iowa inmates complained that injections of the vomit-inducing drug apomorphine, given them without valid consent, constituted cruel and unusual punishment.2 9 The facts established that apomorphine was used in the aversive
treatment of inmates with "behavior problems." Behavior that could result in
an injection of apomorphine included getting-up late in the morning, not
playing in a softball game, giving cigarettes to other inmates, talking, and
smirking. 0 If the staff or other inmates reported such behavior the violator
would be taken to a room containing only a toilet, stripped naked, and given
an intramuscular injection of apomorphine. After a short period of forced
exercise, vomiting would begin and would continue for fifteen minutes to an
hour.31 Several injections of apomorphine were given one inmate without consent. Although the other prisoner gave a signed consent to use of the drug,
he had only an eighth grade education, and testified that he had absolutely
no understanding of the consent form he signed.32 Moreover, any consent, how3
ever obtained, was considered irrevocable 3
Conflicting evidence was offered concerning the usefulness of the technique.
While a prison staff physician compared the physiological effects of apomorphine to aspirin,34 a second expert described the use of apomorphine as worse
than a controlled beating35 and testified that aversive conditioning was a

25. See Reimringer, Morgan & Bramwell, Succinylcholine as a Modifier of Acting-Out
Behavior, 77 CLINICAL MEDICINE 28, 29 (1970).
26. Id.
27. See Note, supra note 5, at 665.
28. 488 F.2d 1186 (8th Cir. 1973).
29. Id.
80. Brief for Appellants at 4, Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973). Also included were "swearing" and "lying." 488 F.2d at 1137.
31. 488 F.2d at 1142. "Respiratory reactions may also occur along with sweating, cramp.
ing, and fainting." Brief for Appellants at 4. "The patient may become pale and somewhat
faint and is always allowed to He down if he feels it necessary. The feeling and effect of
apomorphine might be compared to a short bout with the stomach flu." Id.
32. Brief for Appellants at 4.

33. Id. During the last three years over 700 injections of apomorphine have been administered at the facility. Id.
84. "It is significant to note that Dr. Loeffelholz compared the physiological effects of
apomorphine (other than nausea) to aspirin." Brief for Appellee at 4.
35. Apomorphine is worse than a controlled beating because the one administering the
drug cannot control it after it is administered. 488 F.2d 1136, 1138 (8th Cir. 1973).
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highly questionable technique with a claimed success rate of only twenty to
fifty per cent.3 6
Other authorities, citing the lack of empirical data, support the latter
witness' opinion of the efficacy of aversion therapy.37 Additionally, although
they were not discussed in Knecht, side effects of aversion therapy may include
pain, increased aggressiveness, arousal, anxiety, sleeping difficulties and other
physiological malfunctions, and development of various unexpected and often
38
pathological behaviors.
Even though the above examples of contemporary use of aversion therapy
seem shocking, a psychologist's recent proposal for future use of such therapy
is even more alarming.39 Under his view, aversion therapy could be used to
"treat" armed robbery or "almost any criminal behavior"; such a program
could make a "bank robber want to vomit every time he saw a bank, and could
make an armed robber shudder every time he saw a gun."4 0 Such a proposal,
along with the existing use of aversion therapy, reflects a failure on the part of
some in the medical and scientific sphere to consider adequately the legal
rights affected by use of such techniques. Accordingly, analysis and discussion
of these methods of behavior modification, which in the past have occurred
primarily in a scientific context, 41 must now consider as well the legal rights
of prisoners subjected to such treatment.
PRIOR LAW

Until recent years a judicial policy of nonintervention - the "hands-off
doctrine" - precluded review of prisoner complaints.42 Recent rejection of this
36. Id. "[G]rowing awareness of the dangers of aspiration has caused the practice of the
injections of apomorphine to be dropped, and . . . at present apomorphine has no therapeutic use." Brief for Appellants at 11, citing J. DIPALMA, DRILL'S PHARMACOLOGY IN MEDICINE (4th ed. 1974). Possible toxic effects of apomorphine include persistent nausea, depression of the central nervous system, muscular weakness, irregular and rapid respiration,
tachycardia, a fall in blood pressure, dizziness, fainting, collapse, and death during coma. Id.
at 11-12, citing THE EXTRA PHARMFACOPOCIA (N. Blacow ed. 1972).
37. "Although aversion therapy may produce significant, varied, and longlasting changes
in behavior, its efficacy has not been settled by carefully controlled studies with substantial
numbers of patients." COMPREHENSIvE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 1223 (A. Freedman, H. S.
Kaplan & H. I. Kaplan eds. 1967).
38. MIAMI SYMrosiuN, supra note 19, at 78. See also text accompanying note 23 supra.
39. See Singer, supra note 18, at 433. See also McConnell, Criminals Can Be Brainwashed
-Now, 3 PSYCHOLOGY TODAY 14-]8 (1969).
40. "[S]uch a program could also induce these reactions whenever the convicted thief
even thought or talked about guns and banks. The program could include booster treatments after prison whenever needed. Afterwards, the offender should probably do his banking by mail." Singer, supra note 18, at 433.
41. London, The End of Ideology in Behavior Modification, 27 Ame. PSYCHOLOGIST 913
(1972).
42. "Court review of prisoner complaints is a recent phenomena, [sic] as previously the
courts were inclined to consider all matters concerning federal and state prison administration as beyond judicial concern." Callington, Prison Disciplinary Decisions, 60 J. CRIMt. L.C.
& P.S. 152, 154 (1969). See Comment, The Inadequacy of Prisoner's Rights To Provide Sufficient Protection for Those Confined in Penal Institutions, 48 N.C.L. REv. 847, 849 n.8 (1970);
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policy, 43 however, has led to increasing use of the courts to air inmate grievances, a significant number of which have involved eighth amendment allegations of "cruel and unusual punishment." 44 Thus, the death penalty,4 5 strip
rooms, solitary confinement46 and corporal punishment for prisoners47 have all
been found violative of the eighth amendment. Cases involving behavior
therapy practiced on prisoners, however, were virtually nonexistent until recently, probably because such techniques have only lately received acceptance
by some as legitimate rehabilitative methods.48
In those behavior modification cases that have arisen, the central problem
has been the improper characterization of techniques as "treatment" or "rehabilitation." 49 From a medical standpoint, such characterization may be correct. From a legal standpoint, however, the characterization may be both incorrect and determinative of the final result. Past cases involving assertions of
a right against treatment or rehabilitation, the predecessors of recent behavior
therapy cases, demonstrate this problem. In Peek v. CicconeO a federal district
court rejected contentions that forced injection of an inmate with a tranquilizing drug constituted cruel and unusual punishment.51 The injection was

Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal To Review the Com-

plaints of Convicts, 72
43.

YALE

L.J. 506 (1963).

See Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 486 (1969).

44. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CoNsr. amend. VIII. See, e.g., United States v. Fitzgerald,
466 F.2d 377 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. Miss. 1972); Baker v.
Hamilton, 345 F. Supp. 345, 352-53 (W.D. Ky. 1972); Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93
(N.D. Ohio 1971); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark.), afJ'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir.
1970). See Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and the Substantive Criminal
Law, 79 H~av. L. REv. 635 (1966), for a thorough treatment of the "cruel and unusual punishment" prohibition.
45. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (Brennan, Douglas, & Marshall, JJ., con-

curring).
46. Lakeau v. MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 49 (1973);
Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971).
47. Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968); Nelson v. Heyne, 355 F. Supp. 451
(N.D. Ind. 1972).
48. Some form of behavior modification is now in use in about twenty states. TIME,
March 11, 1974, at 74. See also NEwswEEK, May 20; 1974, at 77. In response to a letter from
the author to Louie L. Wainwright, Director of the Florida Division of Corrections, concerning use of behavior modification techniques in Florida, the following reply was received:
"At present, the Division of Corrections has no officially designated comprehensive program
which uses behavioral modification techniques. Some proposals for behavioral modification
programs are being discussed but are not operational at the present time." Letter from
G. Ray Worley to Robert T. Cunningham, Jr., May 14, 1974.
49. The lack of distinction between the concept of "punishment" and the terms "treatment," "therapy," and "rehabilitation" exists in both legal and medical literature. See Note,
supra note 5, at 655.
50. 288 F. Supp. 329 (W.D. Mo. 1968).
51. Id. at 336-37. The record indicated that three prison guards held Peek while another
administered the injection. The drug injected was thorazine, a tranquilizer prescribed to
"reduce the petitioner's anxiety and hostility." Id.
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characterized simply as "medication," and such characterization provided a
shield from constitutional prohibitions. 2
Courts have recently begun to recognize, however, that the mere characterization of an act as treatment does not insulate it from eighth amendment
scrutiny.53 An example of this trend is Nelson v. Heyne,5 4 where plaintiff inmates successfully argued that injection of a major tranquilizing drug, ostensibly to control "excited behavior," violated their eighth amendment rights.
Evidence indicated the drug had potentially serious side effects, 55 and a federal
district court found such action "shocking to the conscience." 56 Any extension
of this decision may be limited, however, since the court was primarily concerned with the method used to administer the drug rather than with the fact
57
of its administration.
RECENT DEVELOPMENT

The recent cases of Mackey v. Procuniert5 and Knecht v. Gillman59 illus-

trate the continuing trend toward finding eighth amendment violations in the
use of physically intrusive methods of behavior modification. In Mackey, where
the fright-inducing drug anectine was used in an aversion therapy program, 60
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed a federal
district court's dismissal of the prisoner's complaint and remanded, stating that
proof of the inmate's charges could raise serious constitutional questions relating to cruel and unusual punishment.1 Although the court examined the
nature and effect of anectine therapy only peripherally, the extreme character
of the technique was clearly a central concern. 62 The court's conclusion reflected interest, not merely with the mechanics of the technique as in Nelson,
but with the eighth amendment implications of its use. 63 Upon proof of the
52. Id. See also Smith v. Baker, 326 F. Supp. 787 (W.D. Mo. 1970) (injection of tranquilizer against a prisoner's will and religious beliefs denies no federal fight); Veals v.
Ciccone, 281 F. Supp. 1017 (W.D. Mo. 1968) (administration of drugs to prisoners acceptable if sanctioned by any substantial, recognized medical authority).
53. See Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136, 1139 (8th Cir. 1973), citing Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86, 95 (1958).
54. 355 F. Supp. 451, 455 (N.D. Ind. 1972).
55. The drugs are normally used to control psychotic and prepsychotic behavior during
a course of treatment and require close supervision of the patient. Id. at 455. The names
of the specific drugs used were not stated in the opinion.
56. Id. The most frequently recognized standard for cruel and unusual punishment is to
inquire whether the penalty administered shocks the general conscience of civilized society.
See, e.g., William v. Field, 416 F.2d 483, 486 (9th Cir. 1969); Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 970,
972 (8th Cir. 1965).
57. "[N]o drug may be administered inter-muscularly without first attempting oral medication, unless ordered otherwise by a physician in each case." 355 F. Supp. at 455.
58. 477 F. 2d 877 (9th Cir. 1973).
59. 488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973).
60. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
61. 477 F.2d at 878.
62. Id.
63. Id. The Mackey court also noted that proof of plaintiff's allegations could raise
serious constitutional questions respecting impermissible tinkering with the mental processes.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1974

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [1974], Art. 11
19741

THE INVOLUNTARILY CONFINED

plaintiff's allegations, and in light of the appellate court's holding, the district
court on remand should have little difficulty finding anectine therapy "shocking to the conscience" and thus prohibited by the eighth amendment.
The second decision, Knecht v. Gillman, where the vomit-inducing drug
apomorphine was used as an aversive stimulus, 64 confirms the contemporary
judicial proclivity to focus on the eighth amendment and points to a secondary
factor neglected by past courts 5 - informed consent to treatment.6 Accordingly, based on the unacceptability of apomorphine therapy from an eighth
amendment standpoint, and on the issue of consent, the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed a federal district court's dismissal of the inmate's complaint,67 and enjoined use of apomorphine unless pursuant to specifice courtestablished guidelines for securing informed consent. 68 These guidelines included three conditions: 69 the prisoner's written consent to the procedure,
specifying the nature, purpose, risks, and effects of treatment, and accompanied by the certification of a physician that the inmate is mentally competent to understand his consent; free revocability of consent at any time; and
a physician's authorization for each injection. The court declared that unless
these consent requirements are met apomorphine therapy constitutes cruel and
70
unusual punishment.
The ultimate result in Knecht is both desirable and unprecedented; if
subsequent courts follow the ruling, aversion therapy will no longer be an
acceptable form of behavior modification when administered without consent.
The rationale of the case, however, is anomalous. The court indicated that
aversion therapy administered without consent is cruel and unusual punishment. If consent is obtained, however, cruel and unusual punishment is
miraculously transformed into a legitimate form of treatment.7 1 Despite this
64. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
65. See, e.g., Nelson v. Heyne, 355 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Ind. 1972).
66. "The minimum requirement whenever an inmate waives a right against treatment
or rehabilitation ...is fully informed consent." Freund, Ethical Aspects of Experimentation
with Human Subjects, DAEDALUS, spring 1969, at viii. In A CLOCKWORK ORANGE although

Alex requested the "Ludivico Technique" (through which persons were conditioned against
violence by associating it with drug-induced nausea), his "consent" was not informed, since
the mechanism that was to induce conforming behavior and make him "free" was never explained to him in advance. A. BURGESS, A CLocKWoa ORANGE (1972).
67. 488 F.2d at 1136-37. The case was originally assigned to a United States magistrate
for an evidentiary hearing. The magistrate recommended that the complaint be dismissed
but that, if the drug were to be used in the future, certain precautionary steps be taken in
administering the drug. The trial court dismissed the complaint and did not adopt the

magistrate's recommendations.
68. Id. at 1140-41.
69. Id. This need was predicted earlier. "[herapeutic efficacy ought not to be the
exclusive test of legality. Moreover, legal restrictions will have to be developed with respect

to those therapies deemed by the subjects to be unpleasant or aversive .... Aversive therapies should ordinarily require the informed consent of the patient, although it is recognized that the informed consent doctrine will be difficult to apply with a population of
deviants ....
Wexler, Therapeutic Justice, 57 MINN. L. REv. 289, 313-14 (1972).
70. 488 F.2d at 1140.
71. For example, it is doubtful that if the "cat-o-nine tails' were reintroduced as "treatment" its use would be permitted with or without consent.
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anomaly, Knecht, with the added support of Mackey, represents the present
state of the law controlling use of this intrusive method of behavior controlprior informed consent is required.
R.IsOLUTION OF FUTURE ISSUES

Latent issues remain in spite of the firm holding in Knecht. First, one could
argue that the use of coercive and ineffectual behavior technologies on prisoners should be prohibited whether or not adequate consent is obtained, particularly where the technique falls within the "cruel and unusual punishment"
category. Second, the possibility of truly informed consent in the institutional
setting is questionable because of the inherently coercive atmosphere, the deprivations stemming from imprisonment, the desire to attain freedom at any
cost, and the basic inequality between inmate and administrator.7 2 Neither
Mackey nor Knecht addressed these problems, but another recent case, Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health73 struggled with both issues, reaching a
conclusion that exceeds the scope of both Mackey and Knecht.
At issue in Kaimowitz was psychosurgery, the irreversible surgical altera74
tion of parts of the brain for modification and control of violent behavior.
The plaintiff alleged that a mental patient was being illegally detained for the
purpose of psychosurgery, even though the patient had given written consent.75
Applying a two-pronged, integrated test based on a risk-benefit analysis of
psychosurgery and an examination of informed consent,7 6 the Michigan trial
court held that the detention was unconstitutional and that an involuntarily
confined mental patient could not give truly informed consent to psycho77
surgery.
The Knecht court by using the two-pronged test developed in Kaimowitz,
could have reached a more logical and well-reasoned conclusion. Applying the
tests in these factually analogous cases, the primary consideration is that the
benefit to the subject be considerably greater than the risk. The benefits of
72. See Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, Civ. Action No. 73-19434-AV at
26-29 (Cir. Ct., Wayne County, Mich., July 10, 1973).
73. Id. For a discussion of Kaimowitz, see Spoonhour, Psychosurgery and Informed
Consent, 26 U. FLA. L. REV. 432 (1974).
74. See Spoonhour, supra note 73, at 1. See also V. MARK & F. ERVIN, VIOLE.NCE AND THE
BRAIN 27-29, 69-85 (1970). The operation proposed was an amygdalotomy, a cutting of the
fibers of the amygdala located within the limbic system of the brain. Spoonhour, supra note
73, at 38 n.84.
75. Kaimowitz, a local legal services attorney, brought suit on behalf of the unnamed
patient, himself, and individual members of the Medical Committee for Human Rights. See
Spoonhour, supra note 73, at 19. The patient had been committed in 1955 without trial
under the then existing Criminal Sexual Psychopath Law. He had been charged with the
murder and subsequent rape of a student nurse. Civ. Action No. 73-19434-AW at 2 (Cir. Ct.,
Wayne County, Mich., July 10, 1973).
76. See Spoonhour, supra note 73, at 23.
77. Civ. Action No. 73-19434-AW at 2, 31 (Cir. Ct., Wayne County, Mich., July 10, 1973).
The court found that because the risks of psychosurgery so far outweighed the possible benefits and because it was impossible to obtain competent, knowledgable, and voluntary consent.
the operation should be prohibited. See Spoonhour, supra note 73, at 23-24.
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psychosurgery were uncertain- while the dangers were significant, 79 and therefore the Kaimowitz court ruled that psychosurgery should not be undertaken.
The benefits of apomorphine therapy are equally uncertain" and the risks are
also significants1 It would have been appropriate, therefore, for the Knecht
court to rule at the outset that this type of aversion therapy was impermissible.
As a second step, the court in Kaimowitz turned to informed consent and
found that the inherently coercive nature of incarceration, the effects of the
phenomenon of institutionalization, and the uncertain nature of the procedure
to be undertaken precluded truly voluntary and informed consent.82 Each of
these clearly relevant factors existed in Knecht, but none was adequately considered.
Because recent aversion therapy cases have not applied a two-pronged test
similar to that used in Kaimowitz, it is not surprising that antithetical conclusions have been reached - in Kaimowitz informed consent was held impossible, while in Knecht the possibility of voluntary consent was affirmed.
Neither position is a panacea. The former denies that a person could voluntarily submit to a procedure that might have undesirable consequences; yet
such a choice is not inconceivable considering the alternative - continued confinement.8 3 Moreover, the extreme conclusion reached in Kaimowitz invoking
the values of freedom of choice, thought, and action to prevent modification of
behavior, is actually a refusal to permit consent in direct contradiction to these
very values.8 4 To contend that denial of freedom of choice is necessary to secure freedom of choice is logically incongruous.8 5
M

78. "There is no permissive showing on this record that the type of psychosurgery we
are concerned with would necessarily confer any substantial benefit on research subjects ...
Civ. Action No. 73-19434-AW at 16 (Cir. Ct., Wayne County, Mich., July 10, 1973).
79. "Psychosurgery flattens emotional responses, leads to lack of abstract reasoning ability, leads to a loss of capacity for new learning and causes general sedation and apathy. It
can lead to impairment of memory, and in some instances unexpected responses to psychosurgery are observed. It has been found, for example, that heightened rage reaction can
follow surgical intervention on the amygdala, just as placidity can." Id. at 17. See also
A. NoYvs & L. KOLB, MODERN CLINICAL PsYCHIATRY 639, 652-54 (8th ed. 1963). An exhaustive
report prepared by the National Institute of Neurological Disease and Stroke concludes that
psychosurgery has not been proven safe or effective in treating abnormal aggressive behavior.
CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY NEws, March 1974, at 12.

80. See note 36 su!Pra and accompanying text.
81. Id. See also note 35 supra and accompanying text.
82. Civ. Action No. 73-19434-AW at 26-29 (Cir. CL, Wayne County, Mich., July 10, 1973).
83. "[T]o deny that a person could voluntarily choose to submit to an experiment which
might have undesirable consequences because his doing so might help to obtain release from
involuntary confinement smacks of paternalism." Hodson, Reflections Concerning Violence
and the Brain, 9 Cant. L. BuLL. 684, 686 n.6 (1973). This conclusion has also been reached
by one commentator. See Spoonhour, supra note 73, at 37.
84. "There is what I would call an 'extreme thesis' . . that it is in principle impossible
to secure... informed consent from prisoners, and perhaps mental patients, because of the
'inherently coercive' institutional setting... [T]he very value invoked before against coerced
application of such behavior controls - freedom of choice with respect to thought and action
-is also invoked against categorical refusal to permit the consensual use of them." Shapiro,
The Uses of Behavior Control Technologies, 7 IssuEs IN CRIMINOLOGY 55, 69 (1972).
85. Following "treatment," Alex, in A CLOCKWORK ORANGE, was displayed to medical and
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The position taken by the Knecht court affirms the possibility of free
choice, yet inherent in this position are the dangers sought to be avoided by
the "extreme thesis." Institutional pressure and subtle coercion are real. The
desire for freedom and the willingness to undergo extreme discomfort to attain it also exist 8 6 Nevertheless, it is fruitless to circumvent these issues by
denying the possibility of free choice. Instead, the fears of those who adopt
the extreme thesis reflect the nature of our penal system and current methods
of controlling deviant behavior, both of which make free and uncoerced consent extremely difficult to obtain. Arguably, change should begin at the root
of the problem - the penal system itself.87
CONCLUSION

Until the character of our penal system is drastically altered, the problem
of assuring that consent is truly informed and voluntary will remain. Courts
confronted with cases involving behavior control techniques will continue to
struggle with such anomalies as permitting the use of a "treatment" that, without consent, is cruel and unusual punishment, 8 and denying the possibility
of free choice, a deterministic position contrary to the commonly accepted
notion of free will.89 Future courts can avoid this struggle by applying the
tests used in Kaimowitz, but with a shift in emphasis. Rather than depending
on the integration of the two tests to reach a result, 9° courts should take a
more direct approach. First, a court should objectively examine the behavior
control technique at issue including risks, adverse effects, and degree of intrusiveness, and weigh these factors against the benefit to the inmate. If the
known and confirmable benefit to be derived does not significantly outweigh
the adverse factors, then the use of the technique should be prohibited on an
eighth amendment basis and the issue of informed consent need not be

prison officials: "Dr. Brodsky said to the audience: 'Our subject is, you see, impelled towards
the good by, paradoxically, being impelled towards evil. The intention to act violently is
accompanied by strong feelings of physical distress. To counter these the subject has to
switch to a diametrically opposed attitude. Any questions? 'Choice,' rumbled a rich deep
goloss [voice] . . . . 'He has no real choice has he?'" A. BURGEss, supra note 66. See also
H.

HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 182-83

(1968).

86. Results of these institutional phenomena are also evident in the context of human
experimentation. Although prisoners are not supposed to receive a reduced sentence for
volunteering, in one Iowa prison a "thank-you letter" was routinely sent to the warden by
the physician for each volunteer. He said: "It is possible that this letter in the prisoner's
file may favorably influence the parole board." Mitford, Experiments Behind Bars, ATLANTIC

January 1973, 64, 66.
87. If use of behavior control techniques on violent prison inmates is permitted, "their
violence might be subdued at the expense of exposing and reforming atrocious prison conditions that may have been the root cause of their violence and rebelliousness." Wexler, supra
note 69, at 312.
88. See note 71 supra and accompanying text.
89. See J. S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 203 (Harvard Classics ed. 1909).
90. The court in Kaimowitz considered the two factors weighed together. See Spoonhour,
supra note 73, at 23-24.
IMIONTHLY,
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reached.1 Had the Kaimowitz court followed this procedure, the more traditional issue of informed consent would have been irrelevant and a conclusion
denying the inmate's ability to exercise free choice avoided.
Second, if in applying the risk-benefit test the court finds that use of the
method at issue is permissible, then it should focus on assuring that consent
was voluntary and informed. Accordingly, if the court in Knecht had first applied the risk-benefit test and found apomorphine therapy permissible (al92
though the court probably would have reached the opposite conclusion),
then it would have been proper to consider informed consent. When this second step is reached, the court should go beyond the traditional informed consent requirements93 and attempt to develop procedures adaptable to the existing realities of institutional life.94 Avoidance of the critical first step, however,
leads to such anomalies as the conclusion in Knecht.
This proposed two-step approach, while allowing for use of justifiable
medical techniques, would permit courts to bar such reprehensible and degrading methods of behavior control as anectine and apomorphine therapy. It
would also allow courts to avoid becoming entangled in contemporary movements seeking to control and eliminate deviant behavior at any price. Most
importantly, this approach could provide a judicial means of asserting and reaffirming the basic humanity of all men in the face of a burgeoning scientific
and technological world order.95
ROBERT

T. CUNNINGHAM, JR.

91. The eighth amendment includes nothing less than the "dignity of man" and assures
that a state's punishment power "be exercised within the limits of civilized standards. The
amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society." Trop v. Dulles, 856 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958).
92. This conclusion would have been logical in view of the risk-benefit ratio of
apomorphine. See text accompanying notes 79-82 supra. The same conclusion applies to
Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1973), in view of the risks of anectine.
93. For an overview of informed consent, see Spoonhour, supra note 73, at 6-18.
94. Some guidance may be found in the FDA's regulations governing experimentation
with human beings. See 21 C.F.R. §130.37 (1972).
95. "In forming an institutional system to answer 'Who controls whom, why, how, and
under what conditions?' we will necessarily have to consider the role of the courts and their
capacity for review of legislative and other official action. The suggestion made by some that
all matters of treatment be left in the unreviewed discretion of correction or mental hygiene
officers is absurd. It necessarily implies an abdication of judicial function in an area where
it is as needed as it could be." Shapiro, supra note 84, at 92.
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